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This paper studies the effect of constitutional commitment to social security
(CCSS) on different categories of social expenditure. For this purpose, we use
a pooled cross sectional database for 17 EU-countries from 1990 till 2012. We
run OLS models, 2SLS regression models and the Heckman two step model,
with the rigidity of the constitution as exclusion restriction to correct for pos-
sible endogeneity. A positive effect is found of constitutional commitment to
social security on total social expenditure and on all four categories of social
security spending: old age and survivor, incapacity, unemployment and ac-
tive labor market policies (ALMPs). The largest effect sizes, expressed as a
percentage of average spending, are found for expenditure on unemployment
and ALMPs. This indicates that CCSS has the largest effects on expenditure
schemes targeted at minorities which are seen as less deserving. This is in
line with the constitution being a substitute for the median voter and with
the interdependent cost calculus. We find no positive effect on social expendi-
ture schemes that are not related to CCSS, which are the social expenditure
schemes on health and families. This indicates that the positive effect of CCSS
on social security expenditure schemes is due to CCSS.
JEL codes: K31, H55, C36
Keywords: Constitution, Social rights, Social expenditure, Law and eco-
nomics, Constitutional rigidity
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In recent decades, politicians and academics have emphasized the role of social rights
for social and economic development (Townsend, 2007; ILO, 2014). The main ar-
gument for a rights-based approach to development is that it gives an entitlement
that can be enforced in court. Without such a right, people depend on the govern-
ment for proper education, health care and social security. The importance of social
rights in the constitution can be twofold. The constitution can provide universal
rights for everyone, or protect minorities against the majority. This study provides
insights in the character of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS).1
Does CCSS have the largest effects on social expenditure schemes with a universal
character, being complementary to the median voter, or does CCSS have mostly an
effect on expenditure categories targeted at minorities, being a substitute for the
median voter.
In this paper, we study the effect of CCSS on different kinds of social expenditure.
First, we are interested in the effect of CCSS on total social expenditure, which gives
the importance of constitutions for social security. Second, we analyze if the effect
of CCSS is most sizable on social expenditure schemes for beneficiaries who are seen
as less deserving by the public opinion. We expect this if the median voter cares less
about these kinds of social expenditure, leaving a larger role for the constitution. In
other words, we study if political decision making and social rights in the constitution
are substitutes. If political decision making and CCSS are substitutes, then we also
expect that controlling for endogeneity will increase the coefficient size of CCSS.
We run OLS models, 2SLS regression models and the Heckman two step model
with the rigidity of the constitution as instrument to correct for possible endogeneity.
In accordance with our expectations, we find a positive effect of the rigidity of the
constitution on CCSS. This is in line with Landes and Posner (1975), who argue
that the discounted value of the constitution is larger when the constitution is more
durable. This creates an added value of the constitution that supplements laws and
policies.
We use a panel data set for 17 EU-countries from 1990 till 2012. The data on
social expenditure are taken from the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) of the
1The use of the acronym CCSS for constitutional commitment to social security is in line with
Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016)
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OECD. For CCSS, we use the indicator of Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008), which we
define as one or zero, depending on the presence of a legal provision on assistance
to old age, survivors, disability, unemployment, sickness, work injury or the poor.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find a positive significant effect of
CCSS on total social expenditure. This includes a positive effect on spending on
old age and survivor, incapacity, unemployment and active labour market policies.
Second, the most sizable effects, expressed as a percentage of average spending, are
found for spending on unemployment and active labor market policies. Thirdly, no
positive effect is found on expenditure on health and family, which are not covered
in CCSS. This indicates that the positive effect we observe for social security types
of social expenditure is really due to CCSS and not caused by a positive attitude
towards redistribution. We even find a negative effect on spending on family, sug-
gesting that social expenditure on family is partly substituted by spending on social
security.
Our paper relates to two important studies that consider the effect of commit-
ment to social rights in the constitution. Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) were the first
to investigate the effects of the rights to social security, education, health, housing
and workers rights. They find no relation between this rights and expenditure on
these different categories, except for the positive relation between the degree of con-
stitutional commitment to social security and transfer payments and between con-
stitutional commitment to health and health policy performance. In a more recent
paper, Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2016) find a positive relation between constitutional
commitment to social security and the extent and coverage of actual measures of
social security laws. The studies of Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016) are the only
two studies on the effect of commitment to social security in the constitution, which
makes more research on this important topic a valuable contribution.
We make the following contributions to the literature. Knowing if there is an
effect of CCSS on total social expenditure contributes to research on the popular
rights-based approach, as it tells us if social rights contribute to social security.
Second, studying the different effects on different kinds of social expenditure allows
us to explain the effect of CCSS by the median voter theorem of Black (1948) and
the interdependent cost calculus of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). With this we are
the first to study empirically if CCSS is a complement or a substitute to political
decision making. Thirdly, an important contribution is how we correct for possible
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endogeneity in our empirical methodology. We select more similar EU-countries,
control for legal origin and correct for the endogeneity problem by using both 2SLS
models and the Heckman two step model. We use the rigidity of the constitution
as instrument to derive the effect of CCSS on social expenditure. This is more
advanced than in the current literature, which is not going beyond correlations
infered from OLS models for a sample with a wide variety of countries, which we
deem as insufficient to deal with the endogeneity issue as well as to draw conclusions
for the more homogeneous group of EU-countries.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a literature review. Here
we start with a brief description of the history and rationale for the right to social
security in Section 2.1. Afterwards, we build an elaborate theoretical framework
on the effects of CCSS in Section 2.2, in which we link CCSS to political economy
in Section 2.2.1, the interdependent cost calculus in Section 2.2.2, the expressive
function of law in Section 2.2.3 and positive and negative rights in Section 2.2.4.
We proceed with the related empirical literature in Section 2.3. We continue with
describing the methodology with an elaborate discussion on the causes of endogene-
ity and the methodological solutions to deal with this in Section 3.1. We give the
empirical specification in Section 3.2. We discuss the data in Section 4 and the re-
sults in Section 5. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of the results
in Section 6.
2 Constitutional rights and social security
2.1 The history and rationale for the right to social security
The most important international document on human rights is the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted in 1948. The acceptance and
influence of human rights has increased since then. The European Social Charter
came into force in 1961 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in 1966, introducing international social rights. Political and civil
human rights became increasingly important since the Second World War, but there
was a stagnation in the development of social rights in the 1980s and 1990s. This
stagnation was caused by the general policy advice, following from the Washington
Consensus, to restrain social expenditure to prevent market distortions (Williamson,
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2000).2
The increasing importance of social rights has been induced by a resurgence of
the emphasis on good institutions and human rights. As Holzmann et al. (2003)
put it: “Dismissed as ineffective, expensive or even detrimental to development in
developing countries for a long time, it is now increasingly understood that assist-
ing individuals, households and communities in dealing with diverse risks is needed
for accelerated poverty reduction, and sustained economic and social development.”
Human rights are seen as instruments that provide a legal framework for strategies
to reduce poverty. This is a shift from an instrumentalist approach of development
towards an entitlements-based approach that is based on the law (Chinkin, 2001).
Moreover, this implies a shift of obligations between states towards obligations be-
tween states and individual citizens.
Nowadays, an important rationale for social rights among politicians and aca-
demics is to restore the social contract between different income groups in society.
Too high levels of inequality will lead to rent-seeking behavior, see e.g. Stiglitz
(2012), and may put our democratic norms under pressure (Piketty, 2014). A uni-
versal approach aims to build coalitions between different groups in society, between
old and young people, between high and low incomes and between people from dif-
ferent regions (Townsend, 2007). Almost all people will receive from a universal
social security system, at one day in the future, as social insurance and social secu-
rity systems provide pensions and security for the whole population, as it not only
targeted at specific groups. This social insurance function will raise support for a
higher level of social provision among different classes, as also the middle and higher
income groups receive security from an universal social insurance system(Rothstein,
2001).
2.2 Theories on the effects of CCSS
2.2.1 Political economy
In a democracy, we expect the preferences of the median voter to be the most im-
portant determinant for the level of social expenditure (Hotelling, 1929; Black, 1948;
2For example, human rights hardly played any role in the formulation of the Millennium De-
velopment Goals. The focus was on targeting the poorest people of the population rather than
creating minimal living standards for all by using a rights-based approach.
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Downs, 1957). The median voter attaches more value to universal kinds of social
expenditure, compared to targeted forms of social expenditure, as not only the poor
but also the middle class benefits from these types of expenditure. This is supported
by Korpi and Palme (1998), Rothstein (2001) and Larsen (2008) who show that a
more universal character of entitlements causes higher levels of redistribution. In line
with this, social expenditure started to increase in OECD countries when poverty
relief programs were replaced by social insurance programs (Townsend, 2007), which
increased the benefit for the median voter.
When we consider the preferences of the median voter, we also need to look at
altruistic preferences. Van Oorschot (2006) shows that Europeans share a common
and fundamental deservingness culture for needy groups. Elderly people are seen as
most deserving, closely followed by sick and disabled, whereas the unemployed are
seen as less deserving. Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) show also that public atti-
tudes are more positive towards the old and the sick than towards the unemployed.
Knowing the preferences of the median voter allows us to test empirically if CCSS
is a complement or a substitute to normal laws and policies.
We are interested how CCSS can have an effect independent from the median
voter. The difference between constitutional law and normal laws and policies lies
mainly in the more durable character of the constitution. Landes and Posner (1975)
argue that benefits for interest groups are larger if policies or laws are more durable.
This makes the value of constitutional rights for interest groups greater than the
value of normal laws. Politicians know that the durable character of the constitution
will be questioned when they abolish or dramatically change the constitution. They
also know that this would decrease the value of the constitution. For this reason,
politicians are in favor of constitutions even when it limits their power, as they can
use the constitution as a tool to extract rents related to a longer period than the
time being an elected politician.3 As the value of the constitution can be found in its
durable character, we argue that the value of CCSS is larger when the constitution
is more rigid. This greater value makes it more likely that politicians will implement
CCSS. Therefore, we can use the rigidity of the constitution as an instrument to
3Hence, we could explain the existence of constitutions in a multiparty system where different
political parties alternate power. We can show in a game theoretical framework in which a tit
for tat strategy is applied, like in Ordeshook (1992), that the Nash equilibrium is to respect the
constitution.
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derive the effect of CCSS on social expenditure in our empirical part.
2.2.2 The interdependent cost calculus
Constitutional rights may also have economic effects by reducing the sum of external
costs and decision making costs. In this context, decision making costs are the costs
to arrive at a decision to which all players in the decision making process agree,
whereas the external costs are defined as the costs to people that were not involved in
the decision making process. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) devised the theory of the
interdependent cost calculus in which there is a trade-off between decision making
costs and external costs. To reach a decision, the number of costly consultations
and meetings will go up exponentially when more people are involved in the decision
making process. In contrast, the external costs go up exponentially the less people
are involved, as their interests are less and less represented. The efficient level
of involvement is where the sum of the decision making costs and external costs is
lowest. Rights in the constitution can protect minorities and thereby reduce external
costs. Therefore, the efficient level of the number of people involved can go down,
which leads to lower decision making costs Hence, CCSS can protect minorities and
thereby reduce external costs of political decisions and decision making costs.
Besides, more potential efficiency gains will be realized, as decision making costs
can be an obstacle to implement efficient policies when these decision making costs
outweigh the efficiency gains. We can compare this with an efficient contract that is
not concluded when transaction costs are too high (Coase, 1960). Hence, not only
the decision making costs itself are an economic waste, but this decision making
costs are also a barrier for efficiency gains to be implemented.
Thirdly, a reduction of the external costs affects policies through political stabil-
ity. A right to social security gives security to the lower and middle class, thereby
reducing external costs of political decisions on them, as they have at least some
basic rights. This will generate satisfaction among the social benefits receivers and
reduce political instability as their benefit to stand up against their government will
be reduced. Lower risks of resistance against policies by the population will give
politicians more freedom to make more rational rather than populist emotion-driven
decisions. On the other hand, high satisfaction by the population can lead to lower
involvement in politics and thereby lead to more rent-seeking behavior by lobby
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groups, interest groups and politicians at a cost for society.
2.2.3 Expressive function of law
Another way in which CCSS can have an effect on social expenditure can be ex-
plained by the expressive function of law, in which CCSS gives information and
thereby influences behavior. A provision in the constitution indicates that it is
more fundamental. This is another way by which the constitution reduces decision
making costs as it provides the people in the decision making process with a ref-
erence point. Therefore, new generations of politicians will take the preferences of
former politicians more into account when these are stated in the constitution. For
example, Funk (2007) finds in his research on voting turnout that a law without
penalties, targeting at the civic duty, might have a bigger impact on behavior than
actions which affect the costs of provision for the public good. We expect a similar
effect of CCSS as this may have an effect on the political duty to care about social
security. The protection of fundamental values is of value itself as it provides legal
certainty as well as social certainty. This renders it likely that commitment to social
security in the constitution does have an effect on social security expenditure.
2.2.4 Positive and negative rights
One of the main distinctive features of social rights compared to other rights is
that social rights contain positive rights. It is easier to enforce negative rights
to increase negative freedom, which means that individuals are free from external
influence, than to enforce positive rights to increase positive freedom, which refers
to the freedom to do things in an autonomous way (Berlin, 1969). Enforceability
of social and cultural rights is much weaker than the enforceability of many other
rights like property rights, contract law and other rights that put constraints on
government intervention. First, because statements such as “adequate income” or
“to live in dignity” raise the question when the right to social security is fulfilled.
It is arbitrary and subjective when someone is living in dignity or when individuals
have adequate income. Second, the responsibility of states may differ according
to the level of resources of the state. Difficulties in enforcing positive rights may




In this section, we discuss the empirical literature on the effects of social rights.
Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) studied the effects of the rights to social security,
education, health, housing and worker rights in the constitution. They constructed
quantitative indicators for constitutional commitment for these five categories for 68
different countries. For social security, they studied the relationship between CCSS
and the size of government and between CCSS and redistribution policy. They find
no robust relation between constitutional commitment and public policy, except for
the statistically significant association between CCSS and government transfers and
between constitutional commitment to health and health policy performance. They
find that an increase of one standard deviation in their CCSS index is associated
with an increase of 1.7 percentage points in the share of transfers in GDP.
In a more recent study, Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2016) find a positive relation
between their indicator of CCSS and the extent and coverage of actual measures
of social security laws. The constitution seems to explain part of the cross country
variation in welfare coverage around the world. They also tested for interaction
effects between CCSS and the degree of constitutional review, the ease of amend-
ing the constitution, the power of NGOs and international organizations and ethnic
fractionalization. In contrast with theoretical predictions, they find that these in-
stitutional factors do not have a significant influence on the effect of social security
commitment in the constitution on social security policy.
When taking a broader perspective, Blume and Voigt (2007) find that basic
human rights have a positive effect on investments (in physical capital) but do
not contribute to productivity. In contrast to this, social rights do contribute to
productivity improvements but do not have an effect on investment in physical
capital. Dahan and Strawczynski (2013) find a negative effect of fiscal rules on
the ratio of social transfers to government consumption. Persson and Tabellini
(2005) show that a proportional electoral rule is correlated with higher government
expenditure and a presidential system with lower government expenditure. From
these three papers, we can conclude that constitutions do have an effect on political
decision making. However, the literature regarding CCSS is based only on the two




Constitutions can be considered as a representation or expression of social and polit-
ical preferences, which have a deeper root in history, culture and religion. Societies
with a culture that cares more about social security are expected to have both
higher CCSS and higher total social expenditure. Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008,
2016) show that cultural values and history, like religion and legal origin, indeed
have an effect on both constitutional commitment and social benefits. They find
that CCSS is on average higher in countries that share the tradition of French civil
law. They also find that common law countries exhibit on average a lower CCSS.
Constitutional commitments for socialist countries are closer to French civil law
whereas German and Scandinavian traditions resemble the English common law
more closely (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2008). Much of the endogenous variation in
CCSS can be explained by legal origin, which is related to geographical location and
religion. Therefore, controlling for legal origin is needed to determine the partial
effect of CCSS.
Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2016) argue that the endogeneity issue is less of a prob-
lem than we would expect, as it is hard to find common economic, cultural or other
characteristics among countries that share a similar degree of constitutional commit-
ment to social security. For example Scandinavian countries, which are known for
their broad welfare state, have very different levels of CCSS. Finland has very high
CCSS whereas Norway has a CCSS of zero. The same large differences for similar
countries exist all over the sample with Greece having zero commitment whereas
Italy has a very high CCSS. Hungary has a high CCSS while the Czech Republic
has zero CCSS.
Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2016) also argue that endogeneity problems are absent
if the effect of CCSS is interpreted as a proxy for stated preferences of the past,
embedded in the culture. This is in line with Acemoglu et al. (2005), who argue
that economic outcomes and the distribution of resources determine de facto political
power, which has an effect on political institutions as the constitution. In turn, these
institutions have an effect on future redistribution of resources and future political
power. In this chain of causation, we measure the effect of the latest step, that is
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the effect of the ‘stated public preferences in the constitution’ on ‘future political
power’, namely redistribution of resources and future public preferences. In this
interpretation, we thus recognize that this effect is affected by political preferences
when the constitution came into force. Finding an effect of CCSS indicates that
former political preferences have a stronger effect on preferences of current politicians
when these are stated in the constitution. Hence, culture is not a third variable that
makes CCSS endogenous, but CCSS is a proxy of stated public preferences of the
past. This way of reasoning is in line with Acemoglu et al. (2005). Finding a positive
effect makes us conclude that political or public preferences are more durable if they
are stated in the constitution.
To avoid biases in estimating the effect of CCSS, we use the rigidity of the consti-
tution as an instrumental variable to derive the effect of CCSS on social expenditure
in a 2SLS model and in the Heckman two step model. In this models, we assume
that the rigidity of the constitution has an effect on CCSS, but no independent
effect on the social expenditure schemes. It is easy to imagine that CCSS is affected
by the rigidity of the constitution, whereas there is no theoretical basis for such an
independent effect of the rigidity of the constitution on social expenditure. CCSS
is more valuable when the constitution has a higher level of rigidity. A a higher
level of rigidity implies a more durable character of the constitution and this would,
according to Landes and Posner (1975), lead to a higher value for interest groups.
After all, the added value of CCSS on top of normal policies and laws is expected
to be very limited when constitutions are very adaptable. Therefore, we expect a
positive effect of the rigidity of the constitution on CCSS.
In the Heckman correction model, we correct for unobserved correlation between
the selection model and the second stage. We expect a positive correlation, when
CCSS is a complement to political decision making. This is the case when endo-
geneity is mainly driven by a welfare state culture explaining both CCSS and social
expenditure. But we expect a negative correlation, when CCSS is a substitute to
political decision making. This implies that unobservables have a negative effect on
the probability of CCSS and a positive effect on social expenditure. For instance, if
the added value of a statement in the constitution would be smaller when policies
or other laws are already spending a lot on social expenditure.
We also study the effect of CCSS on social expenditures on health and family.
As these are not taken into account in our CCSS, we expect no significant positive
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effect. However, we would still expect to find a positive significant effect of CCSS
on social expenditure on family and health if part of the effect we measure is due
to larger welfare regimes. Not finding such a positive effect can be interpreted as
indication that the effect we find on social security expenditure is due to CCSS and
not due to cultural factors that are both related with CCSS and social expenditure.
3.2 Empirical specification
We use various model specifications to estimate the effect of CCSS on different kinds
of social expenditure. Regression equation (1) is used as a framework for the first
three empirical model specifications:
yit = αt + γCCSSit +X
′
itβx + εit. (1)
The dependent variables of interest are public and mandatory private gross total
social expenditure and spending on old age and survivors, incapacity, unemployment,
ALMPs, health and family, denoted by yit. This outcome variables vary by country
(i = 1, ..., N) and years (t = 1, ..., T ). We regress the outcome variables on a set of
year fixed effects (αt), the control variables old age dependency ratio and GDP per
capita X ′it with coefficients βx and the explanatory variable of interest CCSSit with
coefficient γ. The choice of these two control variables in the baseline model are in
line with the literature (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2016; Rodrik, 1998; Mulligan et al.,
2010). Note that CCSS is constant over time. Therefore the first specification is
cross sectional, as we only use the data for 2008, which is the year in which CCSS
is measured. From specification 2 onwards we use the time period 1990-2012 and
include year dummies to obtain more accurate estimates for our control variables
and for CCSS. In specifications 2 and 3, we also include a first order serial correlation
component in the error term and replace robust standard errors by panel corrected
standard errors. Control variables for legal origin and unemployment are added in
specification 3.
In specification 4, we control for endogeneity by using a 2SLS model using the
rigidity of the constitution as instrument. Our first stage equation is given by
regression equation (2):
CCSSit = αt + δZit +X
′
itβx + µit (2)
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In which Zit denotes the rigidity of the constitution, our instrumental variable,
with coefficient δ. As constitutions are constant, the rigidity of the constitution
is constant over time as well. The second stage is still equal to equation (1). The
rigidity of the constitution is expected to have an effect on CCSS but no direct effect
on social expenditure. As explained earlier, we can use this instrument to control for
possible endogeneity to find a more accurate effect of CCSS on the different kinds
of benefits. The rigidity of the constitution is expected to have a positive effect on
CCSS, as the added value of CCSS on top of laws and policies is larger when the
constitution is more rigid.4
Finally, specification 5 is our preferred model. Here we use the rigidity of the
constitution to estimate the effect by using the Heckman two step model in which
a correction for the correlation between unobservables in the selection model and
unobservables in the second stage is applied (Heckman, 1979). This yields:
Prob(CCSSit = 1|Zi, X ′it) = Prob(−µit < θZit + νxX ′it) (3)
= Φ(θZit + νxX
′
it)

















εit ∼ N(0, σε)





4In our robustness analysis, we find that the rigidity of the constitution is a weak instrument
for the OECD sample, which is denoted by a low F-statistic. Therefore, for the OECD sample, we
can only use our first three (OLS) specifications.
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The first stage, follows from a probit regression model for the probability of
CCSS, see equation (3). Zit denotes the rigidity of the constitution, which is our
exclusion restriction, with parameter θ and X ′it give the explanatory variables GDP
per capita and the old age dependency ratio with parameters νx. Φ is the cumu-
lative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Estimation of this
first stage model yields results that can be used to predict the probability that a
country has CCSS. Equation (4) is our second stage equation, where γ gives the
effect of CCSS when we control for selectivity. We assume that the error terms are
jointly normal and are independent and identically distributed. ρ is the correlation
between unobserved determinants of CCSSi and unobserved determinants of social
expenditure. σε is the standard deviation of εit. We use the inverse mills ratio to
correct for selectivity, in which φ denotes the standard normal density function and
Φ the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We use robust standard
errors to correct for possible heteroscedasticity.
4 Data
We use a pooled cross sectional dataset for 17 EU-countries covering 23 years from
1990 to 2012.5 We choose to focus on EU-countries that are represented in the
OECD for the reason of data availability and because there is less heterogeneity
between these developed countries, making cross country comparison more reliable.
The countries Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia were removed from the
database, because CCSS was not available for these countries. This makes our
selected countries even more comparable with regard to GDP per capita and geo-
graphical location. We focus on the period from 1990 onwards, making the data
set balanced, as this enables us to take the post-Soviet countries into account; a
substantial share of the data is missing for these countries for the period before
1990.
The outcome variables we consider are social expenditure variables for which we
use the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) of the OECD. Our main variable for
social security is public and mandatory private gross total social expenditure as a %
5Countries in EU sample: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom
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of GDP, which we define as total social expenditure.6 This total social expenditure
consists of spending on old age and survivor, incapacity, unemployment, ALMPs,
health and family, which are our next dependent variables.7 A description of the
different social expenditure variables is given in the Appendix in Table A.1.
The explanatory variable of interest is constitutional commitment to social se-
curity, which we call CCSS. This variable is based on the indicator of constitutional
commitment created by Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008), which we transform in a di-
chotomous variable being 1 if there is at least a general statement in the constitution
on a social right to income, unemployment, sickness, work injury, old age, survivor
or disability and 0 if there is no statement on any of these categories. The choice
of first taking the sum of constitutional commitment of these five categories corre-
sponds to Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016). A high overlap and substitutability
between the different types of commitment to social security, caused by the abstract
formulation of the legal provisions, makes us believe that the sum has more explana-
tory power than the individual commitment to social security variables.8 We use a
dichotomous variable in our baseline models, because we expect the existence of a
legal provision in the constitution to be more important than the concreteness of
this legal provision.
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics on social expenditure for countries with
and without CCSS. It shows the means of total social expenditure rates and the
different kinds of social expenditure rates separately, for EU countries over the period
1990-2012. We find that total social expenditure is on average 23.5 percent of GDP
in the countries with CCSS and 22.0 in the countries without CCSS. This difference
is 6.9 percent relative to the mean of total social expenditure for countries without
6Data on net total social expenditure is not available for the different expenditure types, and
very limited for total social expenditure, therefore we use data on gross social expenditure.
7A very small part of total social expenditure consists of expenditure on housing and others. we
choose not to analyze these kinds of social expenditure separately because of the low significance,
on average 0.33% and 0.46% of GDP in the period 1990-2012.
8For example, article 20 of the Dutch constitution may explain an effect on spending in multiple
categories. Article 20 of the Dutch constitution states: 1. It shall be the concern of the authorities
to secure the means of subsistence of the population and to achieve the distribution of wealth. 2.
Rules concerning entitlement to social security shall be laid down by Act of Parliament. 3. Dutch
nationals resident in the Netherlands who are unable to provide for themselves shall have a right,
to be regulated by Act of Parliament, to aid from the authorities.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: differences in means between countries with and
without constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) for the different social
expenditure variables shown as % of GDP
Countries Countries Differences Differences (in %)
with without in relative to Countries
CCSS CCSS Means without CCSS
Total 23.5 22.0 1.5 6.9
Old age and Survivor 9.3 9.5 0.2 −2.0
Incapacity 3.1 2.4 0.7 29.1
Unemployment 1.5 0.8 0.6 76.3
ALMPs 0.9 0.5 0.4 88.4
Health 5.6 5.8 -0.2 −3.5
Family 2.2 2.1 0.1 4.2
Observations 12 5
Sample: 17 EU countries in the years 1990-2012.
CCSS. The relative differences are the largest for spending on unemployment and
ALMPs (respectively 76,3 percent and 88.4 percent relative to the means in countries
without CCSS). Further, in countries with CCSS, we observe less spending on old
age and survivor (−2.0 percent) and more spending on incapacity (+29.1 percent).
Regarding social expenditure which is not taken into account in CCSS, we find
slightly larger spending in countries with CCSS on family (4.2 percent), whereas we
find less spending on health (−3.5 percent).
Further, we create an interaction variable between CCSS and political party in of-
fice to study how constitutional commitment and political party in office have a com-
bined effect on social security benefits. For politics, we use left-wing/center/right-
wing cabinet posts in percentage of total cabinet posts from the comparative Political
Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2013).
Our instrumental variable, the the rigidity of the constitution, is the average
of the standardized indices for rigidity in Lorenz (2005). This index considers the
factors: kinds of majority, success rate, times of voting, unicameral/bi-cameral leg-
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islature, initiative actors, special body or regulator legislature, need of elections
between two votes, electoral system, approval by referendum, approval by states’
legislatures. The rigidity of the constitution, CCSS and total social expenditure are
given voor the different countries in the year 2008 in Table A.2.
The control variables we use are GDP per head of population (USD in thousands,
constant prices, 2010 PPPs), the old age dependency ratio (percentage of 65+ rela-
tive to 15-64 years old), dummies for legal origin, unemployment rate (standardized
unemployment rate, all persons) and year dummies, see the appendix Table A.3 for
the descriptive statistics. These control variables are chosen as they have the largest
effects on the social expenditure schemes and are expected to influence the effect of
CCSS on social expenditure. These control variables are in line with the literature
(Kittel et al., 2003; Mulligan et al., 2010; Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2008, 2016). For
legal origin we use dummies for French, English, German and Scandinavian legal
origin, where we use socialist legal origin as the reference category.
In our robustness analysis, we will also investigate the effect for the sample of EU-
countries together with Iceland, Switzerland and Norway, as well as for a sample
of OECD countries without Japan and Korea.9 Japan and Korea are outliers as
they have a different Asian system with very low levels of social spending, making
our results insignificant.10 Japan and Korea are outliers for reasons independent of
CCSS and therefore we decided to drop these two countries from our database.
5 Results
Table 2 presents the regression results of CCSS on total social expenditure. Column
(1) shows the results for the year 2008 where we only control for GDP per capita and
the old age dependency ratio. This specification suggests a positive effect, significant
at a 10 percent level, indicating that countries with CCSS spend on average 1.99
9Countries in OECD sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom and the United States
10Reasons for low spending in Japan and Korea can be found in social policies as means rather
than as goals, larger involvement of family and private sector in the welfare mix, late start of
welfare system, top-down development of social policies, colonial past and the neglect for social
services targeting woman (Hong, 2014).
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percentage points of GDP more on total social expenditure. This implies that the
mean total social expenditure rate for countries with CCSS is 9% higher than for
countries without CCSS.
In Column (2), we use the years 1990-2012 and add year dummies to our empirical
specification. The robust standard errors are replaced by panel corrected standard
errors and we include a first order serial correlation component. The effect of CCSS
on total social expenditures slightly increases and is highly significant now.
Adding control variables for the unemployment rate and legal origin, in column
(3), does not change much. German legal origin and Scandinavian legal origin have
the largest positive effect on total social expenditure, socialist and English legal
origin the lowest. The unemployment rate increases total social expenditure, which
we expected as it controls for business cycle differences.
The effect of CCSS on total social expenditure increases to 3.05 percentage points
in our 2SLS model, in which we use the rigidity of the constitution as instrument.
An increase in the coefficient suggests an underestimation of the effect size when
we do not control for endogeneity. This could be explained by the constitution
being a substitute for political decision making. In the first stage regression, we
find a large positive effect of the rigidity of the constitution on CCSS. The F-test
of excluded instruments is easily rejected with an F-value of 73.59, see Table 3,
suggesting sufficient relevance of our instrument.
In column (5), the effect size increases to 3.76 percentage points when we control
for unobserved correlation between our selection model and second stage regressions
by using the Heckman two step model. The effect size in our preferred specification,
column 5, is a substantial 17% relative to the mean of total social expenditure for
countries without CCSS. Also the extent to which the Heckman two step model is
correcting for unobserved correlation, denoted by rho, is with a value of −0.38 within
acceptable proportions. The negative rho means that there is a lower probability
of CCSS when other factors (e.g. politicians or labor unions) already take care of
social expenditure.
Table 4 presents the effect of CCSS on the different social spending categories
when we split up total social expenditure. The largest effect sizes, expressed as
a percentage of average spending, are found for expenditure on unemployment and
ALMPs. In our preferred specification, column 5, a positive effect of 2.11 percentage
points is found for expenditure on unemployment, which is an increase of 248%
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Table 2: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) on
total social expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CCSS 1.990∗ 2.198∗∗∗ 2.261∗∗∗ 3.053∗∗∗ 3.763∗∗∗
(1.099) (0.664) (0.862) (0.939) (1.015)
Old age dependency ratio 0.574∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.087) (0.083) (0.059) (0.061)
GDP per capita 1.081 −0.858∗∗ −1.534∗∗∗ 1.336∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗
(0.671) (0.402) (0.518) (0.243) (0.249)
Unemployment rate 0.185∗∗∗
(0.034)
French legal origin 4.325∗∗∗
(1.277)
English legal origin 1.577
(1.268)
German legal origin 10.170∗∗∗
(1.451)
Scandinavian legal origin 8.432∗∗∗
(1.450)
Constant 3.957 8.243∗∗∗ 12.230∗∗∗ 0.111 −0.614
(2.602) (1.853) (2.068) (1.651) (1.720)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Observations 17 382 359 382 382
R-squared 0.601 0.748 0.843 0.459
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level and *** at the 1% level.
Table 3: First stage results: the rigidity of the constitution on constitutional com-





Old age dependency ratio −0.016∗∗
(0.007)





* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table 4: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) on different
kinds of social expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) %∆
Total social expenditure 1.990∗ 2.198∗∗∗ 2.261∗∗∗ 3.053∗∗∗ 3.763∗∗∗ 17%
(1.099) (0.664) (0.862) (0.939) (1.015)
Correlation (rho) −0.363
Old age and Survivor 0.698 −0.005 0.063 3.233∗∗∗ 2.464∗∗∗ 26%
(1.154) (0.525) (0.620) (0.688) (0.522)
Correlation (rho) −0.609
Incapacity 0.684 0.681∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 28%
(0.433) (0.243) (0.219) (0.329) (0.343)
Correlation (rho) −0.020
Unemployment 0.475 0.757∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗ 248%
(0.290) (0.195) (0.187) (0.351) (0.098)
Correlation (rho) −0.924
ALMPs 0.282∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 99%
(0.100) (0.074) (0.073) (0.110) (0.067)
Correlation (rho) −0.108
Health −0.066 0.055 0.004 −0.030 0.056 1%
(0.375) (0.223) (0.335) (0.237) (0.145)
Correlation (rho) −0.142
Family −0.063 0.119 0.218 −2.303∗∗∗ −1.684∗∗∗ −79%
(0.404) (0.160) (0.203) (0.409) (0.0742)
Correlation (rho) 0.983
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls legal origin No No Yes No No
controls unemployment No No Yes No No
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and
*** at the 1% level.
relative to the mean of expenditure on unemployment in countries without CCSS.
For expenditure on ALMPs we find a coefficient of 0.48, which is an increase of 99%
relative to the mean. Although smaller in relative size, we still find large positive
significant effects of CCSS on expenditure on old age and survivor and on incapacity.
A positive coefficient of 2.46 is found for old age and survivor, which is about 26%
relative to the mean in countries without CCSS and we find a positive effect of 0.69
percentage points for incapacity which is about 28% relative to the mean. However,
for the effect on old age and survivor we find no significant effect in specifications
(2) and (3), suggesting that we have to be more careful in drawing conclusions.
We find a negative rho for all kinds of social expenditure except for expenditure on
family benefits. Meaning that for all these other social expenditure schemes, there
is a lower probability of CCSS when other factors (e.g. politicians or labor unions)
already take care of social expenditure.
No significant positive effect is found on health and family spending, which are
not taken into account in the CCSS variable. This provides extra evidence that the
effects we find on social security expenditure are really due to CCSS and not due to
a third factor, such as a large welfare state. We even observe a negative significant
effect on family, suggesting that this social expenditure type is substituted by expen-
diture on social security. This may be explained by government budget constraints
or because the government takes into account the total budget of the needy, which
is already higher when they can rely on generous social security benefits.
The results remain the same in the robust analysis. Table A.4 in the appendix
shows that the results are robust when we add the European non-EU countries:
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Table A.5 shows robust results in our sample of
28 OECD countries, when we exclude Japan and Korea as they have a different Asian
system. Further, we find the same positive effects when we only consider the period
before the Great Recession (1990-2009), in Table A.6. Finally, the results remain
robust when we standardize the 3 values with the lowest and highest rigidity of the
constitution and when we transform the variable for the rigidity of the constitution
in a dichotomous variable, to correct for possible outliers, see Table A.7 and Table
A.8.
We study non-linear effects in Tables A.9 and interaction effects with politics in
Table A.10, see the appendix. In Table A.9 we observe significant negative effects
of the square of CCSS on total social expenditure, suggesting that the concreteness
21
of CCSS is less important than the statement itself. Regarding interaction effects
with politics, no effect is found of left-wing cabinet seats on social expenditure,
nor of left-wing cabinet seats interacted with CCSS, see Table A.10 appendix. We
find some evidence that more right-wing cabinet seats translate in lower total social
expenditure but that the interaction between right-wing cabinet seats and CCSS
has a positive effect on total social expenditure. This suggests that right-wing
politicians reduce total social spending less when there is CCSS. However, more
research is required on this result as the effect is not significant in specifications (2)
to (4).
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we studied the effect of constitutional commitment to social security
(CCSS) on different kinds of social expenditure. We used a pooled cross sectional
database for 17 EU-countries from 1990 till 2012.
The main challenge of research on institutions like CCSS is that they are re-
lated to many other things like culture, religion, legal origin, geography, political
institutions, etc. We deal with this potential endogeneity problem extensively by
limiting the sample to more similar EU-countries, control for legal origin and use
2SLS models and the Heckman two step model with the rigidity of the constitution
as exclusion restriction.
First, we find a positive significant effect of CCSS on total social security ex-
penditure, which increases when we control for endogeneity. This includes positive
effects on the categories of social expenditure on old age and survivor, incapac-
ity, unemployment and active labor market policies. This is in accordance with the
rights-based approach to development, which supplements the focus on market insti-
tutions and property rights with human rights and social policies (Townsend, 2007;
ILO, 2014). This result corresponds with the findings of Ben-Bassat and Dahan
(2008, 2016) who find a positive relation between CCSS and transfer payments and
between CCSS and the extent and coverage of measures of social security laws.
Second, the results show that the added value of CCSS is mostly found for
expenditure on unemployment and ALMPs. Only a minority of the citizens are
beneficiaries of social spending on unemployment or active labour market policies.
Besides, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) and Van Oorschot (2006) show that the
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general public perceives the unemployed as less deserving than the old and disabled,
suggesting lower support for spending on the unemployed by the median voter. This
could explain why CCSS, rather than the median voter theory alone, can explain the
scope of expenditure on unemployment and ALMPs. Hence, the importance of CCSS
is mainly to protect minorities, which makes CCSS a substitute for political decision
making. This is also in line with the theory of the interdependent cost calculus,
in which Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that the role of the constitution is
mainly to protect minorities. These theories are also supported by finding more
sizable effects when we control for endogeneity, indicating that CCSS and politics
are indeed substitutes.
Thirdly, No positive significant effect is found for expenditure on families and
health which are the two social expenditure categories that are not included in CCSS.
This indicates that the positive relation between CCSS and the social security types
of social expenditure is really due to CCSS and not due to different social preferences
that affect both CCSS and social expenditure.
Future research is necessary on the the mechanisms by which CCSS could effect
different types of social expenditure. Another valuable contribution would be to
exploit changes in CCSS over time, as we rely on a limited amount of variation due
to the time invariance of our index for constitutional commitment to social security.
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Table A.1: The OECD social expenditure categories
Category Description
Old-age Pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help and
residential services for the elderly.
Survivors Pensions and funeral payments.
Incapacity Care services, disability benefits, benefits accruing from occupational injury
and accident legislation, employee sickness payments.
Health Spending on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, prevention.
Family Child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support during leave
and sole parent payments.
ALMPs Active Labour Market Policies: employment services, training youth measures
subsidized employment, employment measures for the disabled.
Unemployment Unemployment compensation, severance pay and
early retirement for labour market reasons.
Housing Housing allowances and rent subsidies.
Other Social policy areas, non-categorical cash benefits to low-income households,
other social services; i.e. support programs such as food subsidies.
Description of the different categories is taken from OECD (2007)
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics: values of constitutional commitment to social
scurity (CCSS) and the rigidity of the constitution for the different countries
Country Year Total CCSS Rigidity const.
EU countries
Austria 2008 26.40 0 -0.47
Belgium 2008 26.31 1 0.64
Czech Republic 2008 18.21 0 -0.18
Denmark 2008 27.44 1 0.37
Finland 2008 23.34 1 -0.08
France 2008 28.54 1 -0.64
Germany 2008 25.30 0 0.16
Greece 2008 21.41 0 -0.34
Hungary 2008 22.65 1 -0.41
Ireland 2008 18.49 1 -0.43
Italy 2008 26.19 1 -0.16
Netherlands 2008 20.16 1 0.65
Poland 2008 20.23 1 -0.02
Portugal 2008 22.57 1 -0.47
Spain 2008 22.19 1 0.58
Sweden 2008 25.95 1 -1.12
United Kingdom 2008 21.72 0 -2.03
Other European countries
Iceland 2008 20.24 1
Norway 2008 20.35 0 0.05
Switzerland 2008 22.48 1 0.36
Other non-European OECD countries
Anglo-Saxon:
Australia 2008 18.87 0 0.88
Canada 2008 16.31 0 0.55
New Zealand 2008 19.35 0 -1.91
United States 2008 16.84 0 2.07
Non-Anglo-Saxon:
Chile 2008 12.18 1 0.44
Israel 2008 15.96 0
Mexico 2008 6.84 1
Turkey 2008 11.58 1
Asian countries
Japan 2008 20.18 1 1
Korea 2008 8.26 1 0.44
The rigidity of the constitution is not available for Iceland, Isral, Mexico and Turkey
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of all used variables: extention of Table 1.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total 382 23.0 4.3 12.4 34.6
Old age and survivor 382 9.3 2.8 3.1 17.5
Incapacity 382 2.9 1.238 0.8 6.4
Unemployment 388 1.3 1.0 0.0 4.6
ALMPs 388 0.8 0.5 0.1 2.7
Health 390 5.7 1.1 3.2 8.5
Family 382 2.2 1.0 0.3 4.5
CCSS (dummy) 391 0.71 0.46 0 1
CCSS (non-dichotomous) 391 0.64 0.72 0 2.14
Rigidity constitution 391 -0.23 0.65 -2.03 0.65
GDP per capita (in thousands) 390 3.1 0.8 0.9 4.8
Old age dependency ratio 391 23.3 3.4 15.5 32.2
Unemployment rate 362 8.6 3.8 1.7 24.8
French civil law 391 0.41 0.49 0 1
English common law 391 0.12 0.32 0 1
German law 391 0.12 0.32 0 1
Socialist law 391 0.18 0.38 0 1
Scandinavian law 391 0.18 0.38 0 1
Sample: EU-countries.
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Table A.4: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) on differ-
ent kinds of social expenditure: sample of EU-countries plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total social expenditure 2.134∗ 1.655∗∗∗ 1.496∗∗∗ 2.385∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗
(1.058) (0.501) (0.491) (0.903) (0.837)
Old age and Survivor 0.776 0.067 0.190 3.380∗∗∗ 3.040∗∗∗
(0.921) (0.418) (0.557) (0.683) (0.785)
Incapacity 0.421 0.252 0.165 0.617∗ 0.328
(0.409) (0.180) (0.107) (0.318) (0.329)
Unemployment 0.499∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗ 1.984∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.193) (0.206) (0.304) (0.246)
ALMPs 0.266∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.087) (0.095) (0.113) (0.115)
Health 0.175 0.207 0.061 −0.231 −0.063
(0.417) (0.215) (0.276) (0.235) (0.152)
Family −0.058 −0.046 0.052 −2.387∗∗∗ −1.869∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.165) (0.141) (0.399) (0.089)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 20 20 20 19 19
Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. The rigidity of the constitution is not available for Iceland, leaving 19 countries in
specification (4) and (5). * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to
social security (CCSS) on different kinds of social expenditure:
sample of OECD countries minus Japan and Korea
(1) (2) (3)
Total social expenditure 1.989∗∗ 1.299∗∗ 1.694∗∗∗
(0.847) (0.576) (0.616)
Old age and Survivor 1.185∗ 0.641∗ 0.103
(0.675) (0.369) (0.546)
Incapacity 0.559 0.442∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗
(0.410) (0.145) (0.157)
Unemployment 0.379 0.378∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.156) (0.167)
ALMPs 0.265∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.066) (0.084)
Health −0.379 −0.412∗∗∗ −0.021
(0.366) (0.114) (0.340)
Family 0.044 −0.026 0.286∗∗
(0.402) (0.170) (0.119)
Year dummies No Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE
AR(1) component NO YES YES
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 28 28 28
Only OLS models lead to reliable results when considering the OECD, because the
rigidity of the constitution has lower explanatory power for CCSS (lower F-statistic)
and it is harder to argue that the exclusion restriction still holds as the rigidity of the
constitution may be endogeneous due to larger cultural differences when considering the
OECD rather than merely the EU countries represented in the OECD. Japan and Korea
are excluded from the sample as they have a different Asian system of social security, in
which social expenditure is typically much lower. * denotes significant at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.6: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) on
different kinds of social expenditure: period before Great Recession (1990-2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total social expenditure 1.990∗ 2.226∗∗∗ 2.565∗∗∗ 3.544∗∗∗ 3.949∗∗∗
(1.099) (0.696) (0.603) (1.086) (0.992)
Old age and Survivor 0.698 0.202 0.475 3.598∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗
(1.154) (0.295) (0.502) (0.782) (0.853)
Incapacity 0.684 0.701∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.705∗ 0.560
(0.433) (0.275) (0.200) (0.386) (0.400)
Unemployment 0.475 0.672∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗ 2.049∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.160) (0.147) (0.368) (0.112)
ALMPs 0.282∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.0823) (0.0862) (0.128) (0.0713)
Health −0.0662 0.0778 0.133 0.0280 0.118
(0.375) (0.200) (0.237) (0.242) (0.129)
Family −0.0633 0.141 0.242 −2.043∗∗∗ −1.772∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.159) (0.204) (0.423) (0.104)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.7: Estimation results of constitutional
commitment to social security (CCSS) on differ-
ent kinds of social expenditure: highest and lowest
values of rigidity standardized
(1) (2)
Total social expenditure 2.562∗ 3.362∗∗
(1.545) (1.341)












Year dummies Yes Yes
Method 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO NO
Years 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution.
Highest values of rigidity, for The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain,
are standardized to 0.37 and the lowest values of rigidity, for United
Kingdom, Sweden and France, are standardized to −0.47. By this
standardization we try to be as objective as possible as we choose 3
outliers of both sides of the distribution. The values 0.37 and −0.47
are equal to the values of the fourth observation from both sides of the
distribution. This choice is also based on the consideration that the
mean of the rigidity of the constitution is slightly negative. For the
Heckman model on family expenditure we did not control for the old
age dependency ratio as there was a discontinuous region encountered.
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at
the 1% level.
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Table A.8: Estimation results of constitutional
commitment to social security (CCSS) on different
kinds of social expenditure: rigidity as a dichoto-
mous variable
(1) (2)
Total social expenditure 4.357∗∗∗ 3.894∗∗∗
(1.074) (0.870)












Year dummies Yes Yes
Method 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO NO
Years 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution.
The dichotomous variable for the rigidity of the constitution = 1 if the
the rigidity of the constitution > −0.17 and 0 otherwise. Countries
with a rigid constitution are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Poland and Spain. Countries with no rigid
constitution are Austria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For the Heck-
man model on family expenditure we did not control for the old age
dependency ratio as there was a discontinuous region encountered. *
denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the
1% level.
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Table A.9: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social
security (CCSS) on different kinds of social expenditure: CCSS as non-
dichotomous variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total
CCSS 5.629∗ 1.621 4.219∗∗ 4.542∗∗∗
(2.641) (1.655) (1.743) (1.523)
CCSS squared −2.794∗∗ −1.008 −2.698∗∗∗
(1.230) (0.763) (0.763)
old age and Survivor
CCSS 1.783 −0.681 1.213 4.810∗∗∗
(2.407) (1.067) (1.017) (0.878)
CCSS squared −0.872 0.382 −0.582
(1.069) (0.452) (0.448)
Incapacity
CCSS 0.749 −0.454 0.659 1.167∗∗
(1.307) (0.660) (0.423) (0.578)
CCSS squared −0.275 0.212 −0.447∗∗
(0.619) (0.337) (0.202)
Unemployment
CCSS 1.836 1.707∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗ 3.175∗∗∗
(1.038) (0.535) (0.356) (0.773)
CCSS squared −0.779 −0.790∗∗∗ −0.584∗∗∗
(0.527) (0.247) (0.156)
ALMPs
CCSS 0.48∗ 0.506∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.230) (0.198) (0.217)
CCSS squared −0.216∗ −0.258∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.121) (0.103)
Health
CCSS 0.793 0.580 0.196 −0.0446
(0.949) (0.466) (0.537) (0.355)
CCSS squared −0.573 −0.387∗ −0.255
(0.539) (0.215) (0.232)
Family
CCSS 0.166 −0.408 0.503 −3.426∗∗∗
(1.210) (0.306) (0.403) (0.754)
CCSS squared −0.099 0.103 −0.359∗∗
(0.552) (0.134) (0.167)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the
10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.10: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) on total
social expenditure: interaction with politics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CCSS 4.394∗∗ 2.399∗∗∗ 2.229∗∗∗ 4.715 3.201∗∗∗
(1.655) (0.595) (0.819) (2.982) (1.081)
Government left 0.030 0.002 −0.000 0.027 0.002
(0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.007)
Government left*CCSS −0.062∗ −0.004 −0.000 −0.029 0.012
(0.029) (0.004) (0.003) (0.040) (0.010)
CCSS −1.105 2.117∗∗∗ 2.370∗∗∗ 1.272 1.997∗∗
(1.251) (0.608) (0.834) (1.558) (0.942)
Government right −0.040∗∗ −0.005 0.002 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0148) (0.007)
Government right*CCSS 0.084∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.003 0.031 0.035∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.010)
CCSS 3.564∗∗ 2.197∗∗∗ 2.145∗∗∗ 3.006∗∗∗ 3.507∗∗∗
(1.159) (0.668) (0.825) (0.926) (0.782)
Government center 0.034 0.002 −0.007 0.064∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.011)
Government center*CCSS −0.086 0.006 0.012∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.012)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Observations 17 381 359 381 381
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and
*** at the 1% level.
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